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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, : APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
v. Supreme Court No. 880385 
JOEL E. COLLEY, Priority 13 
Defendant/Appellant, 
—oooOooo— 
IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
The only interested parties are named in the caption. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
A copy of the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, endorsed "not for 
publication," is reproduced infra at A-2. 
PRIOR HISTORY 
Plaintiff-Respondent Robin L. Hough (hereinafter "Ms. Hough") filed this 
action against Defendant-Appellant Joel E. Colley (hereinafter "Dr. Colley") seeking 
termination of the common-law marriage allegedly existing between the parties and the 
distribution of the substantial assets that the parties had jointly acquired during the 
tenure of that relationship. (Amended Complaint, R. at 19-37, as amended R. at 835-
36.) In the alternative, Ms. Hough sought the dissolution of the partnership created 
between the parties and the distribution of the assets that the parties held jointly as 
partners. (Id.) 
The trial court refused to recognize any common-law marriage but decreed 
that the partnership between the parties be dissolved, the valid and legitimate 
encumbrances be satisfied, and the remaining equity be divided equally between the 
parties in accordance with their agreement. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
R. at 1077-1081, reproduced infra at A-10 through A-14, and Judgment, R. at 1082-83, 
reproduced infra at A-15 through A-16.) 
Dissatisfied with this result and apparently believing that he was entitled to 
retain for his personal benefit all of the property that the parties had jointly acquired 
during their decade-long relationship, Dr. CoUey appealed to this Court. (R. at 1107-
08.) This Court "poured over" his appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed both the District Court's refusal to recognize any marriage and its 
partnership dissolution. Dr. Colley petitioned for rehearing, which was denied. Still 
dissatisfied, he now seeks review by Writ of Certiorari to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It was in the late summer of 1972 in Galveston, Texas, that the parties first 
met. (R. at 1167-68 and 1169.) Ms. Hough, who had not previously been married, was 
22 years of age and attending the University of Texas, majoring in occupational therapy. 
(R. at 1168.) Dr. Colley, who had been married at age 19 and divorced within a couple 
of years (R. at 1487), was just entering the final year of medical school at the same 
institution (R. at 1169). Ms. Hough had located a large apartment above a grocery 
store in Galveston and was looking for another student with whom to share the expenses 
of that housing. (R. at 1469.) The parties met by chance and Dr. Colley accepted 
Ms. Hough's offer to share the accommodations. (R. at 1169-70.) 
At first, Ms. Hough and Dr. Colley each had their own living quarters and 
shared only common facilities such as the kitchen. (R. at 1472.). Each led their own 
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academic and social lives, and each continued to date their respective boy- and girl-
friend. (R. at 1471 and 1171.) Soon, however, a relationship developed between the 
parties, which led to romantic, and then sexual, involvement. (R. at 1171 and 
R. at 1473.) In short, they "both fell head over heels in love." (R. at 1172.) 
As the academic year ended, Dr. Colley learned that his internship would be 
served in Philadelphia. (R. at 1173.) When classes ended for the summer of 1973, 
Dr. Colley moved to Philadelphia for his internship. (R. at 1483.) Ms. Hough had to 
complete six weeks of an "externship" in Indianapolis to earn her degree in occupational 
therapy. (R. at 1177.) Most of the parties' combined furniture and belongings was 
shipped to Philadelphia (R. at 1370) and Ms. Hough joined Dr. Colley there as soon as 
her "externship" was completed. (Id.) 
The parties remained in Philadelphia for approximately a year while 
Dr. Colley completed his internship. (R. at 1489.) Ms. Hough took a job as an 
occupational therapist in the psychiatric ward of the University of Pennsylvania Hospital 
in Philadelphia. (R. at 1178.). She and Dr. Colley opened joint checking accounts and 
continued to pool their resources. (R. at 1178.) 
At the completion of Dr. Colley's internship, the parties moved, during the 
summer of 1974, to Hot Springs, Montana, where Dr. Colley had made arrangements 
to open a private practice. (R. at 1186.) Again, the parties opened joint accounts and 
commingled their funds (R. at 1186), although maintaining separate "professional" 
accounts for Dr. Colley's medical practice and Ms. Hough's practice as a therapist. 
(R. at 1186 and R. at 1188-89.) The parties purchased a house in Hot Springs to which 
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they took title as "Joel E. Colley and Robin H. Colley." (See, Exhibit 20-P reproduced 
in part infra at A-19.) 
In early 1975, after only a few months in Montana, Dr. Colley wanted to 
move so that he might attend an anesthesiology residency program. After "vacationing" 
for several weeks (R. at 1192), the parties lived in Texas again for five or six months 
(R. at 1193), and then moved to Denver, Colorado (R. at 1196). Dr. Colley participated 
in the residency program at the University of Colorado (R. at 1197) and Ms. Hough 
became employed as the Director of Occupational Therapy at the Presbyterian Hospital 
(R. at 1202). Again the parties combined their economic resources (R. at 1202) and 
purchased a home, taking title as "husband and wife" (R. at 1197-99, and see Exhibits 
8-P and 9-P reproduced infra at A-20 and A-21 through A-24). 
After only a few months, Dr. Colley became disenchanted with the residency 
program at the University of Colorado (R, at 1504) and decided to move to Salt Lake 
City so that he could complete his anesthesiology residency at the University Medical 
Center (R. at 1203). Ms. Hough accepted a position at Holy Cross Hospital here in Salt 
Lake City as its Director of Occupational Therapy. (R. at 1203.) The parties together 
purchased residences here, first on Claiborne Avenue (R. at 1209) and, later, on 
Northcliffe Drive (R. at 1210). Ms. Hough continued as Director of Occupational 
Therapy at Holy Cross Hospital until March of 1978 (R. at 1208), when, at the 
suggestion of Dr. Colley, she left that position to begin a career in real estate 
(R. at 1514-15). 
Having attained her real estate license, Ms, Hough involved herself in the 
acquiring of real estate for her and Dr. Colley's mutual benefit. (R. at 1209.) 
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Ms. Hough located and evaluated numerous properties that the parties, together, 
purchased. (R. at 1209 and see generally, R. at 1210-16.) Title to these properties was 
generally acquired in their joint names. {See, e.g., id. and Exhibits 10-P through 23-P 
and 39-P, R. at 1216.) It was Ms. Hough's responsibility to locate, evaluate, manage, 
clean, rent, and repair their properties. (R. at 1216-17 and 1218.) While Ms. Hough 
did not discuss in detail every aspect of every transaction with Dr. Colley, handling the 
ministerial details of the parties' real estate investments herself, the parties did discuss 
any major decisions. (R. at 1348.) 
During the tenure of their relationship within the state of Utah, the parties 
together purchased parcels of real estate, some of which were sold at a profit to 
purchase other parcels but many of which were still owned in their joint names at the 
time of the trial. At the time of the trial, the parties owned properties on Northcliffe, 
Leslie, 9th Avenue, Browning, Wilson, and 700 East Streets in Salt Lake City, and 
property on Flathead Lake and in Hot Springs, Montana, as well as land near Spring 
Creek, Nephi, and Deer Valley, Utah. (Findings at f7, R. at 1079, infra at A-12.) 
Additionally, the parties jointly held the sellers' interest under a real estate contract 
arising from their sale of property on Roberta Street in Salt Lake City. (Id.) 
While Ms. Hough acknowledges that there was no specific agreement that she 
would be compensated for her time or effort in locating, managing, and administering 
the substantial real estate holdings being acquired and traded by the parties 
(R. at 1310), the agreement between the parties was that, should they ever separate, all 
of their holdings would be divided equally (R. at 1350). Dr. Colley reassured 
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Ms. Hough that even property held in his name alone would be equally divided should 
they separate. (R. at 1351.) 
At trial, this aspect of the partnership between the parties - critical to the 
appeal - was firmly corroborated by the testimony of three independent witnesses. 
Dr. Wirt Hines testified that, in 1977 and 1978, Dr. Colley frequently told him that he 
had an arrangement with Ms. Hough that they would share everything "50-50" if they 
"split up." (R. at 1447.) Similarly, June Lambert testified that Dr. Colley told her that, 
if Dr. Colley and Ms. Hough should separate, their property would be "divided equally." 
(R. at 1453.) Dr. Donald Heinig testified that, during the winter of 1980, Dr. Colley 
told him that if Dr. Colley and Ms. Hough ever separated, there would be a "50-50 split" 
of their properties. (R. at 1462.) 
Additionally, the parties' agreement as to the manner in which their 
partnership property was to be divided was further documented when they both acquired 
a one-third interest in a travel agency. The acquisition of this interest necessitated that 
the parties each obtain a fidelity bond. (R. at 1220-21.) In connection with the 
application for that bond, the parties had to submit a schedule of their assets (See, 
Exhibits 24-P and 25-P, R. at 1221 and 1223, reproduced infra at A-25 through A-28 and 
A-29 through A-31.) Dr. Colley wrote in his own hand on both schedules of the parties' 
properties that "(1) Joel E. Colley, M.D. is 1/2 owner of Properties below and (2) Robin 
L. Hough (Colley) is 1/2 owner of Properties below." (R. at 1221 and 1222 and Exhibits 
24-P and 25-P infra at A-28 and A-31.) 
Acrimony followed in the wake of their separation and the parties were 
unable to agree as to either the management or the disposition of the properties. At 
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one point, Dr. Coiley, through threats and coercion (R. at 1380-81), obtained from 
Ms. Hough signed Quit Claim Deeds to all the properties (R. at 1381); however, he 
gave no consideration for these deeds (R. at 1381) and did not rely upon them at trial. 
After the separation of the parties, Dr. Coiley alone continued to receive the substantial 
tax benefits from the parties' properties. Dr. Coiley admitted that these benefits had 
an actual value to him of at least $100,000. (R. at 1666.) 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, authored by Judge Bench with which 
Judges Graff and Orme both concurred, while abbreviated, is entirely consistent with 
these facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS UNTIMELY. 
The Court of Appeals released its decision affirming the District Court's 
decision in this matter on July 13, 1988. {See, Opinion infra at A-2.) Dissatisfied, 
Dr. Coiley petitioned for rehearing. Dr. Coiley states in his Petition (Pet. for Cert, at 
2) that the Order Denying Rehearing was "dated and filed July 27, 1988."1 
The time within which a party may petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorari 
is prescribed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Utah Supreme Court. In pertinent part, that 
Rule provides: 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a Writ Certiorari 
must be filed with the Clerk of the [Utah Supreme 
Court] within 30 days after the entry of the decision by 
the Court of Appeals. 
1The office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals states that the Petition for 
Rehearing was actually denied on July 29, 1988. See, Affidavit infra at A-32. 
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(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a 
petition for a Writ of Certiorari runs from the date the 
decision is entered by the Court of Appeals, not from 
the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, 
a petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the 
time for filing the petition for a Writ of Certiorari for 
all parties . . . runs from the date of the denial of 
rehearing . . . . 
Rule 45 R.U.S.C. (emphasis added). Accordingly, since Dr. Colley's Petition for 
Certiorari was not filed with this Court until October 14, 1988, it was clearly untimely 
unless a valid extension of time was properly obtained. 
The requisite circumstances and procedures for obtaining an extension of time 
for the filing of a petition for certiorari are detailed in subsection (e) of Rule 45 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. That Rule mandates: 
[The Utah Supreme Court,] upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for 
filing a petition . . . for a Writ of Certiorari upon motion 
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by (a) or (c) of this Rule, whichever is applicable. 
Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the court otherwise 
requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after 
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed 
time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later. 
Rule 45(e) R.U.S.C. (emphasis added). Dr. Colley filed an ex parte motion dated 
September 12,1988, with this Court.2 Based upon that motion, The Honorable Richard 
Howe signed an Order dated September 12, 1988, purporting to extend to October 14, 
1988, the time for Dr. Colley to file his Petition. Not only was the application for this 
2The motion is stamped as having been "filed" October 14, 1988. A copy is 
reproduced infra at A-17. 
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extension made on an ex parte basis, neither Ms. Hough nor her counsel received any 
notice of it until copies of Dr. Colley's Petition for Certiorari were received in October.3 
The September 12, 1988, Order purporting to extend the deadline for the 
petition to October 14, 1988, is invalid under the specific requirements of Rule 45(e) 
both (i) because it was obtained ex parte more than 30 days after the expiration of the 
original deadline established by Rule 45(c) and (ii) because it purports to extend the 
deadline for the filing of the petition beyond the absolute maximum established by the 
final sentence of Rule 45(e).4 Having been untimely filed, the Petition for Certiorari 
must be denied. 
POINT II: REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
The considerations governing the granting of a Writ of Certiorari by this 
Court to review a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals are set forth in Rule 43 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. That rule makes clear that a Writ of Certiorari will 
be granted only infrequently and in truly extraordinary cases: 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there 
are special and important reasons therefor. 
Rule 43, R.U.S.C. (emphasis added). 
3Rule 21(b), R.U.S.C, requires that "copies of all papers filed by any party shall, 
at or before the time of filing, be served on all parties . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
4Thirty days after July 29, 1988, was August 28, 1988, "the prescribed time." 
Thirty days after that date was September 27, 1988. Thus, on September 12, 1988, 
the absolute latest date to which the deadline for the Petition could have been 
validly extended was September 27, 1988, which is later of 10 days after the date of 
the Order or 30 days after the "prescribed time." 
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This case meets none of the four criteria set forth in the rule because there 
is no conflict between panels of the Court of Appeals; there can be no contention that 
the court of appeals has "so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings . . . " as to require review of its decision; the legal questions decided by the 
Court of Appeals fall squarely within firmly established partnership law and rules of 
procedure; and, for the same reason, there is no conflict between the decisions of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in this case and any prior decision of this Court. 
There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about this case; it is simply a case 
in which a man and woman formed a financial as well as emotional relationship and, 
through their joint resources and efforts, accumulated substantial property. The Court 
of Appeals simply applied well-established principles of partnership law in determining 
that the trial judge in this case had not erred when he ruled that the parties' specific 
agreement as to the distribution of their assets should be enforced. 
In an effort to bring this case within the extremely narrow parameters of Rule 
43, Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner Colley attempts to create artificially a tension or 
inconsistency between the Court of Appeals' decision in this case and the public policy 
of this state. Dr. Colley's argument is that the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
by their decisions have in some way rewarded Ms. Hough for her relationship with 
Dr. Colley, which he characterizes as "meretricious." Dr. Colley's argument fails to 
recognize the obvious. 
It is obvious that, if Ms. Hough's relationship with Dr. Colley was 
"meretricious," his relationship with her was equally so. It is obvious that it is an 
existing fact that Dr. Colley and Ms. Hough together purchased, acquired, and now 
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own, substantial property. It is obvious that all of that property not distributed to 
Ms. Hough will be retained by Dr. Colley. Therefore, to vacate the District Court's 
partnership dissolution would be to reward Dr. Colley by allowing him to retain all of 
the property that the parties together purchased and now own. Such a result would be 
equally contrary to the public policy that Dr. Colley asserts, since it would have the 
effect of rewarding him for his "meretricious" relationship with Ms. Hough. In truth, the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals has nothing to do with the public policy of this 
State. The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there was no 
marriage relationship between these parties, at common law or otherwise. The District 
Court simply found, and the Court of Appeals simply affirmed, that these two parties 
had together acquired property from which they had realized a profit. The resulting 
partnership was then dissolved and the accumulated properties and liabilities distributed 
in accordance with firmly established traditional principles of partnership law5. To allow 
further review in this case is merely to protract the litigation process. The Utah Court 
of Appeals was not intended to create yet a third step in the litigation process; it was 
intended to reduce the insurmountable workload of this Court. To allow review by Writ 
of Certiorari in this case would be to wholly defeat that beneficial purpose. 
These principles are discussed infra at Point III. 
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURTS RECOGNITION OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF ITS ASSETS IS FIRMLY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Dr. Colley makes clear his dissatisfaction with the trial court's finding, 
affirmed unanimously by the Court of Appeals, that a partnership exists and its decree 
that the assets of the partnership be sold, the valid and legitimate encumbrances be 
paid, and the remaining equity be divided equally. Dr. Colley does not clearly state 
what relief he seeks, asking merely that certiorari be granted so that this Court can 
"correct the erroneous ruling by the Court of Appeals." Merely reversing the trial 
court's determination that a partnership existed would leave these parties as joint owners 
of property with respect to the management of which they are deadlocked. The 
impracticality of such a result is obvious. 
A. A Partnership Existed Between the Parties. 
The lower courts were entirely correct in their determinations that a 
partnership existed between these parties. This Court has long recognized that, 
essentially, a partnership is formed whenever two or more persons join together to 
carry on some activity for their common benefit, with each contributing property or 
services for their joint profit. Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 Pac. 736 (1908). 
The Partnership Act, first adopted in 1921, is entirely consistent with that traditional 
definition of partnership, providing in §48-1-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), that "a partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners a business for profit." It is not disputed that Ms. Hough and Dr. Colley 
12 
hoped to realize a profit from the properties that they purchased together {see, e.g., 
R. at 1209 and 1693-94.) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Colley was asked whether he recognized that a 
partnership existed between him and Ms. Hough. He first denied that he acknowledged 
the existence of such a partnership (R. at 1688-89), but then acknowledged that in 
earlier testimony he had in fact admitted that there "was a partnership . . . in my mind" 
(R. at 1690). He also acknowledged that he had testified during his deposition as 
follows: 
Question: Did you feel that you were in a partnership with 
[Ms. Hough] in the purchase, acquisition, 
management of these properties? 
Answer: A partnership until [Ms. Hough] would consent 
to marry me. 
Deposition of Colley at 104:17-20.6 Accordingly, Dr. Colley has, himself, acknowledged 
the existence of a partnership with Ms. Hough. 
Moreover, the conduct of the parties in acquiring a substantial number of 
properties together and trading those properties for profit is clear and appropriate 
evidence of their partnership. This Court held, in Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 
98 Pac. 188 (1908), that a partnership between father and son was amply and 
appropriately demonstrated by the conduct of the father and son in forming and carrying 
on their business activities. In so holding, this Court noted: 
The rule is well settled that the existence of a partnership 
may be implied from circumstances, and especially so where, 
as in this case, the facts and circumstances proved at the 
All of the pre-trial depositions were published by stipulation of the parties and 
order of the court. (R. at 1240.) 
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trial not only tended to show the existence of an actual 
partnership, but were inconsistent with any other theory. 
34 Utah at --, 98 Pac. at 188. This observation is equally applicable to the present case, 
where it is abundantly clear from the evidence that Ms. Hough and Dr. CoUey 
purchased, sold, and held numerous pieces of real estate with the intent to increase their 
financial resources. And this is exactly what Dr. Colley testified was his intention: 
Answer: . . . . The deal was to work toward getting 
properties -
Question: Okay. 
Answer: - that we would accumulate and she would 
accumulate and pay towards, so we would have this 
enormous amount of wealth that now looks like an 
enormous amount of debt. 
R. at 1693. While Dr. Colley protested at trial that the properties that he had 
accumulated together with Ms. Hough were of little value7, this does not alter the fact 
that he has acknowledged that he and Ms. Hough purchased the properties together in 
the hope and for the purpose of making a profit. 
Dr. Colley's own testimony firmly supports the District Court's finding, 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that a partnership existed between the parties and 
that the parties purchased the various properties jointly for the purpose and with the 
expectation of making a profit. Under these circumstances, the challenge to the finding 
of a partnership is entirely without merit. 
It can be noted in passing that his contention that the properties were of little 
value is belied by his refusal to share the properties with Ms. Hough, by his 
energetic defense of the action in District Court, and by his vigorous pursuit of 
Petitions for both Rehearing and Certiorari following the affirmance of the District 
Court's decision to distribute the properties equally. 
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B. It Was the Parties' Specific Agreement That Partnership Assets Would Be Divided 
Equally. 
Dr. Colley argues (App. Br. at 16-22) that, even if a partnership exists, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals misapplied the applicable law in distributing 
the properties owned by the parties. In essence, Dr. Colley argues that every dollar that 
he contributed to the partnership should be reimbursed to him out of the proceeds of 
the sale of the partnership properties but that Ms. Hough should receive no 
reimbursement for her contribution of her time and talent in locating, investigating, 
evaluating, purchasing, managing, repairing, renting, and selling the parties' properties. 
The inequity of Dr. Colley's position is obvious and the trial court's rejection of it is 
sound. 
The trial court did not deny Appellant reimbursement for the valid loans 
that he made to the parties' partnership. Rather, the lower courts carefully ruled that 
"any mortgages signed by both parties for monies loaned by [Dr. Colley's] profit sharing 
plan" would be considered valid and those obligations would be repaid before the 
remaining equity in that particular property was distributed evenly between the parties. 
(Findings at 58, R. at 1080, reproduced infra at A-13.) Thus, it was only certain alleged 
mortgages, which had been signed only by Dr. Colley himself, that the court found to 
be "self serving" and not to "constitute liabilities against the partnership assets." 
(Findings at 58, R. at 1080, reproduced infra at A-13.) As to those instances in which, 
prior to the onset of acrimony between the parties, both parties had recognized funds 
advanced by Dr. Colley to be a loan, the lower courts properly endeavored to preserve 
the parties' intent and provided for reimbursement to Dr. Colley. 
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The law does not require the distribution advocated by Appellant as the 
parties agreed to a different distribution. Dr. Colley principally relies in support of his 
contention that the lower courts erred in distributing the partnership property upon the 
provisions of §48-1-37(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Dr. Colley's 
argument is that all of the money that Dr. Colley invested in the properties should have 
been reimbursed to him before Ms. Hough received any of the proceeds. (App. Br. at 
16-20.) In his argument, however, Dr. Colley wholly overlooks the fact that the statute 
expressly provides that its rule of reimbursing partners "in respect of capital" before 
distributing the remaining profits to partners is "subject to any agreement to the 
contrary." 
In this case, the trial court, based upon a wealth of substantial and credible 
evidence, found that there was, in fact, an 'agreement to the contrary.' For example, 
in the Findings of Fact (which were prepared by the trial judge himself, not by counsel 
for Ms. Hough), the Court expressly found that "the parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they would share equally in all the property and the proceeds thereon!' 
(Findings at 56, R. at 1079, reproduced infra at A-12.) The trial court also went on to 
find that the parties "understood and agreed that [Ms, Hough] would devote all her time 
and talents to the property and [Dr. Colley] would contribute money but that both 
would share on an equal basis." {Id.) Moreover, the trial court expressly found that 
"any funds put into the partnership by [Dr. Colley] were capital contributions matched 
by the efforts of [Ms. Hough]." (Findings at flO, R. at 1080, reproduced infra at A-13.) 
Accordingly, when Dr, Colley claims that the trial court misapplied the law by failing 
to reimburse him for his capital contributions before dividing equally the remaining 
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equity in the property, Dr. Colley cavalierly ignores the language of the very statute 
upon which he relies since the parties were found by the trial court to have expressly 
agreed to an even distribution of the assets upon dissolution of the partnership. 
The parties agreed to a distribution different from that advocated by 
Appellant. In his Memorandum Decision, the trial court noted that "any funds put into 
these properties by [Dr. Colley] were capital contributions matched by the efforts of 
[Ms, Hough]." (Memo. Dec. at 2, R. at 939, reproduced infra at A-7.) Thereafter, in 
response to a Motion to "Clarify Order" filed by Dr. Colley (R. at 554-55), a hearing was 
held at which the trial court specifically considered and refused Dr. Colley's request that 
the dollar amount of his financial contributions should be reimbursed to him before the 
remaining equity in the properties was divided between the parties. Judge Conder noted 
that the ruling did not provide for such reimbursement 
cause I took the position that [Dr. Colley] was the financier 
and that was his 50 percent whatever he put in to finance 
t h a t . . . . 
R. at 1783-84. After further argument by Dr. Colley's counsel, Judge Conder reiterated 
the court's ruling: 
Well, let me give you my thinking on that. As I reviewed 
the notes and everything, I thought okay, [Dr. Colley] was 
to be the financier; he had the money and he was to put up 
the money for the partnership and for the acquisition of the 
properties. Now, what he did was to take the money out of 
his profit sharing and put it into the acquisition of 
properties. 
R. at 1786. These findings by the Court are entirely consistent with the substantial 
weight of the evidence adduced at the trial. 
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The evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the parties had agreed 
that, upon dissolution, the assets of the partnership would be evenly distributed between 
them notwithstanding Dr. Colley's allegedly greater economic contributions to the 
partnership, can only be characterized as strong and convincing. Not only did 
Ms. Hough testify that this was their agreement (e.g.9 R. at 1350-1351), she also 
presented the testimony of no less than three independent witnesses who had been told 
by Dr. CoUey himself that this was indeed his agreement with Ms. Hough. 
First, Dr. Wirt Anderson Hines II testified that he was acquainted with 
Dr. Colley through a training program at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
(R. at 1444-45.) Dr. Hines testified that during the time he had known Dr. Colley, there 
had been conversations between them in which Dr. Colley discussed the entitlement that 
Ms. Hough would have to property that she had purchased with Dr. Colley in the event 
that they were to separate. (R. at 1445-57.) Dr. Hines testified that in 1977 and 1978 
he had had several conversations with Dr. Colley on this topic and it "was always 
[Dr. Colley's] contention that whatever they had acquired together in possessions, 
property, or whatever since they had begun living together, that they would divide up 
on a 50-50 basis." (R. at 1447.) 
Similarly, June E. T. Lambert testified that she had been a friend of 
Dr. Colley for several years and that she worked at Holy Cross Hospital where 
Dr. Colley had been on staff until shortly before the trial. (R. at 1451-52.) She testified 
that she had had conversations with Dr. Colley in which the subject of the division that 
would occur in the property he and Ms. Hough had acquired together was discussed. 
(R. at 1452.) These conversations occurred during 1976 and 1977. (Id.) She testified 
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that Dr. Colley told her that "in the event that anything should happen to the 
relationship, that their property would be divided equally." (R. at 1453.) 
Dr. Donald Heinig also testified that he was a social acquaintance of 
Dr. Colley. (R. at 1461.) He testified that during the winter of 1980 he had a 
conversation with Dr. Colley in the parties' residence on Northcliffe Drive with respect 
to the property distribution that would occur in the event that Dr. Colley and 
Ms. Hough should separate. (R. at 1461.) Dr. Heinig testified that Dr. Colley had 
"offered the information that if they ever split up, that there would be a 50-50 split." 
(R. at 1462.) 
The most graphic evidence attesting to the agreement between Ms. Hough 
and Dr. Colley that the partnership assets would be evenly divided upon any dissolution 
of the partnership is found, however, in Exhibits 24-P and 25-P, which bear a notation 
in Dr. Colley's own handwriting to the effect that he and Ms. Hough are equal owners 
of the real properties comprising the assets of the partnership. {See, Exhibits 24-P and 
25-P, reproduced infra at A-25 through A-28 and A-29 through A-31.) These notations 
were made on the property schedules attached to applications for fidelity bonds that 
Ms. Hough and Dr. Colley both needed in connection with their acquisitions of equal 
interests in a travel agency business. The notations were made by Dr. Colley himself. 
(R. at 1221 and 1222.) The notations read, "Joel E. Colley, M.D., is 1/2 owner of all 
Properties below [; and] Robin L. Hough (Colley) is 1/2 owner of all Properties below." 
{Id. and see Exhibits 24-P and 25-P infra at A-28 and A-31.) 
In the face of this massive amount of independent testimony and documentary 
evidence of the parties' specific agreement that, in the event of the dissolution of their 
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partnership, the partnership assets would be divided evenly, Dr. Colley's protestations 
that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that they had 
such an agreement are entirely without merit. The lower courts correctly applied 
relevant Utah law and gave effect to the parties' own agreement varying the statutory 
scheme, which is to be utilized only if the parties have not otherwise agreed. The lower 
courts committed no error in the distribution of the partnership assets. 
CONCLUSION 
This case falls far short of meeting the very narrowly defined parameters 
under which this Court should grant a petition for review of a decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari. The Court of Appeals was intended to reduce 
this Court's insurmountable workload, not to add a third step to the litigation process. 
Accordingly, only in infrequent and truly extraordinary cases should certiorari be granted. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is entirely consistent with firmly 
established partnership law principles. Further review is unnecessary and is 
inappropriate. The petition must be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of November, L988. 
DART, ADAMSON & CASTING 
B. L. Dart 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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for Writ of Certiorari to be mailed, postage prepaid, to J. Thomas Bowen, 36 South 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Robin L. Hough, ) 
Plaintiff, Respondent and ) OPINION 
Cross-Appellant, ) (Not For Publication) 
v
* ) 
Joel E, Colley, ) Case No. 880123-CA 
Defendant, Appellant and ) 
Cross-Respondent. ) 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff and defendant both appeal from a judgment of 
the trial court dismissing plaintiff's claim for divorce of an 
alleged common-law marriage and dissolving a partnership the 
court found existed between the parties. We affirm. 
Plaintiff Robin Hough and defendant Joel Colley met in 
August 1972 while students at the University of Texas in 
Galveston, Texas. Defendant was in his last year of medical 
school and plaintiff was majoring in occupational therapy. 
They began living together solely to share expenses and 
utilities, but shortly thereafter developed an emotional/ 
sexual relationship. Defendant graduated in the spring of 1973 
and moved to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to complete a one-year 
internship. Plaintiff moved to Indianapolis to complete a 
required six-week externship prior to graduation. Once 
plaintiff completed her externship, she joined defendant in 
Pennsylvania and obtained employment as an occupational 
therapist. The parties pooled their resources and opened a 
joint checking account, but also maintained separate 
professional accounts. 
ULED 
O ^ * " * Coo* 
^ Coun<* Appe,,, 
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In the summer of 1974, when defendant completed his 
internship, the parties moved to Hot Springs, Montana where 
defendant operated a private practice. The parties purchased a 
home while in Montana. After a few months, they moved to 
Arkansas. In mid-1975, they moved to Colorado where defendant 
enrolled in an anesthesiology residency program and plaintiff 
became employed as director of occupational therapy at a local 
hospital. The parties purchased a home in Colorado. 
In December 1975, defendant transferred to the University 
of Utah to complete his residency in anesthesiology. Plaintiff 
followed in early 1976, and found employment as director of 
occupational therapy at Holy Cross Hospital. In September 
1978, plaintiff made a career change to real estate. She 
enjoyed substantial success as a realtor, and began purchasing 
parcels of real estate, generally in both parties1 names, but 
using defendant's professional retirement account funds.for 
down payments. 
The parties separated in October 1981, and plaintiff 
filed this action in June 1982. In her complaint, plaintiff 
alleged she and defendant were married in Galveston on.August. 
24, 1972• She requested a divorce and an equitable division of 
their property. Plaintiff amended her complaint in June 1983, 
alleging the parties lived together as husband and wife in 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, Colorado, and Utah. She also,. 
alleged they purchased their several properties under a 
partnership agreement and sought an accounting and dissolution-
of the partnership. In an amendment to her amended complaint, 
filed in January 1985, plaintiff alleged the parties cohabited 
in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Colorado with the 
understanding and agreement they became married at common law 
in each state. In his answer and counterclaim, defendant 
denied the existence of any marriage or partnership. In the 
event the court found a partnership existed, he counterclaiiaed 
for a return of his capital contributions. 
Trial was held on February 6 and 7, 1985. In his 
findings, conclusions, and judgment, the trial court dismissed 
with prejudice plaintiff's claim of a common-law marriage. The 
court found a partnership existed regarding the properties 
purchased in Utah. The court ordered the properties sold, all 
mortgages and other third-party obligations paid, and the net 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
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On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in finding no 
common-law marriage. We will not disturb the findings of the 
trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania,- and Texas all recognize 
common-law marriages. See, e.g., People v. Lucero, 707 P.2d 
1040 (Colo. App. 1985); Hurley v. Hurlev, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont. 
1986); In re Cumminas Estate, 330 Pa. Super. 255, 479 A.2d 537 
(1984); Salavandia v. State, 651 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1983) • Three elements, common to each state, must be shown to 
establish a common-law marriage: 1) an agreement to marry; 2) 
cohabitation as husband and wife; and 3) public reputation as 
husband and wife. 
The trial court found, -[The parties] did not agree 
between themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold 
themselves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the 
requirements of a common law marriage.- Although disputed, 
defendant presented substantial, competent evidence at trial to 
support the trial court's findings. The findings underlying 
the conclusion of no common-law marriage are not clearly 
erroneous and are therefore affirmed. Sather v. Pitcher, 748 
P.2d 191 (Utah App. 1987). 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding a 
partnership existed and in its distribution of the alleged 
partnership's assets. A partnership is defined as -an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit.- Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1981). Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-37(2) (1981) provides: 
In settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution the following rules 
shall be observed, subject to any 
agreement to the contrary: The 
liabilities of the partnership shall rank 
in order of payment, as follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other 
than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other 
than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in 
respect of capital. 
880123-CA 
(d) Those owing to partners in 
.respect of profits• 
(Emphasis added.) Defendant claims he and plaintiff were not 
associated in a business for profit. Even assuming a 
partnership existed, defendant contends the court erred in not 
first returning to him his capital contributions. 
The trial court found: 
[T]he parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they would share 
equally in all the property and the 
proceeds thereon. It was understood and 
agreed that the plaintiff would devote all 
her time and talents to the property and 
defendant would contribute money but that 
both would share on an equal basis. 
• • • 
[A]ny mortgages signed by both parties for 
monies loaned by defendant's profit 
sharing plan . . . are to be recognized 
as valid. If there are mortgages signed 
only by the defendant, the court finds 
they are self-serving and do not 
constitute liabilities against the 
partnership assets. 
. . . 
[A]ny contributions made by either of the 
parties . . . should be deemed part of 
their common effort and matched by the 
efforts and services of the other party 
for which no further accounting should be 
required. 
Any funds put into the partnership by the 
defendant were capital contributions 
matched by the efforts of plaintiff. 
Although disputed, plaintiff presented substantial, competent 
evidence at trial to support the court's findings. The trial 
court's finding of a partnership is not clearly erroneous and 
is therefore affirmed. Given the court's finding of an express 
agreement to "share equally,* which is also supported by 
sufficient evidence, the distribution scheme of section 
880123-CA 
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48-1-37(2) is inapplicable and the court's distribution of the 
partnership assets is not clearly erroneous• 
The judgment is affirmed. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
880123-CA 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY H. O U ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ S f i . ORwt 
STATE OF UTAH rs7/Deputy Clec* 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, : 
Plaintiff, : Memorandum Decision 
va I Civil No. D82-3064 
JOEL E. COLLEY, * 
•Defendant. : 
This matter was tried before the court on February 6, 
1985. Written arguments have been submitted by each counsel. 
Both counsel have done an exhaustive job in researching the 
law and an excellent job in presenting the facts. 
The parties commenced living together in Galveston, 
Texas, in August, 1972. Both were students and -found 
initially that they could share expenses and save money by 
living together. They grew up in an era when living together 
was a vogue among many young people. The defendant obtained 
his medical degree and they moved from Texas to Pennsylvania 
to Montana to Colorado and to Utah. All of the foregoing 
states except Utah recognize a "common law marriage". The 
first issue before the court is whether the parties have 
formed a common law marriage in any one of the jurisdictions. 
The elements of such a marriage appear to be substantially 
the> same in each of these jurisdictions, namely, (1) the 
parties must have agreed between themselves to be married; 
TV—*7 
(2) a-fter such an agreement they must have lived together as 
man and wife; and (3) they must have held themselves out to 
the public as man and wife. Certainlv, in this case there is 
no doubt that they lived together as man and wife. This 
court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden 
of proof as to the other two elements and therefore holds 
that there is no common law marriage. 
During their "relationship" the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate here in Utah. The court finds that 
as to this property the parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they were sharing equally in all of the 
property. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote her time and talent to the property and that the 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
50—50. The partnership property consists of the following: 
(1) 780 Northcliffe; <2> contract receivable on 1358 Roberta; 
(3) 382 Leslie; <4) 520 - 9th Avenue; (5) Deer valley lot; 
(6> 231 Browning; (7) 514 East Wilson; 770 South 7th East; 
(8) Flatfhead, Montana; (9) Hot Springs^ Montana; (10) Nephi 
land; and (11) Spring Creek property. As to all other assets 
the court finds that the parties acquired these in their sole 
and separate property. The court finds that any funds put 
into these properties by the defendant were capital 
contributions matched by the efforts of the plaintiff. All 
of these properties should be liquidated and after paying any 
obligations to third parties the net proceeds should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
Under these circumstances neither attorney's -Fees nor 
costs should be awarded to either party. 
Dated this [J day of March, 1985. 
Dean Ei-. Conder, 
District Judge. 
ATTEST 
Copies o-f the foregoing to be mailed to each counsel. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
VS. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D, 82-3064 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appear-
ing in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and wit-
nesses including the parties having been sworn and testified, 
and exhibits having been received and the matter having been 
argued and submitted, and the Court having received post-trial 
briefs and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there 
having been further argument on the interpretation and content 
of the Memorandum Decision, the Court now being fully advised, 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties commenced living together in Galveston, 
Texas, in August 1972. Both were students and shared expenses 
and money by living together. They moved from Texas to Pennsyl-
vania, to Montana, to Colorado and to Utah* All the foregoing 
states except Utah recognizes common law mar age* The parties 
resided with each other until late October, 1981, when they 
separated, 
2. During the nine-year period, defendant completed 
his last year of medical school at the University of Texas, 
a one-year internship at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
two years of residency in anesthesiology at the University 
of Colorado and the University of Utah, During this time 
the plaintiff obtained her college degree in Occupational 
Therapy, The parties lived together, filed jqint income tax 
returns and purchased property. They did not agree between 
themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold them-
selves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the re-
quirements of a common law marriage. The court finds that 
there was no common law marriage between these parties. 
3. During their relationship, the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate in the state of Utah and as to this 
property, the court finds the parties were partners under 
circumstances where each of the parties committed his or her 
total time, effort and talents to the partnership. This 
partnership is further evidenced by the manner in which the 
parties purchased the properties and held title and applica-
tions they filed for fidelity bonds in which they reflected 
their common ownership. 
4. The parties ceased residing together on October 30, 
1981. 
-2-
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5. On July 30, 1982, plaintiff filed this action for 
divorce• In June, 1983, plaintiff amended her complaint and 
also alleged that a partnership existed, between plaintiff 
and defendant which partnership plaintiff requested be dissolved 
and that the assets of the partnership be equitably distributed, 
6. The court finds that as to the real estate holdings 
of the parties hereinafter set forth in the next following 
paragraph, the parties were partners with an agreed understanding 
that they would share equally in all the property and the 
proceeds thereon. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote all her time and talents to the property and 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
on an equal basis. 
7. The partnership property consists of the following: 
a. 780 Northcliffe, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
b. Contract receivable at 1358 Roberta, Salt Lake 
City, Utah; 
c. 382 Leslie, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
d. 520 - 9th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
e. Lot, Deer Valley, Utah; 
f. 231 Browning, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
g. 514 East Wilson, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
h. 770 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
i. Flathead, Montana; 
j e Hot Springs, Montana; 
k« Nephi, Utah; 
1. Spring Creek property. 
„3-
As to all other assets acquired during the relationship 
of the parties, the court finds the parties acquired these 
as their sole and separate property and not in partnership 
except as to properties in which the parties expressly had 
a partnership agreement which includes a half-interest in 
a lot in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and a partnership relating to 
a duplex on the west side of Salt Lake City, 
8. The court further finds that as to any mortgages 
signed by both parties for monies loaned by defendant's profit 
sharing plan that said mortgages and liabilities thereon are 
to be recognized as valid. If there are mortgages signed 
only by the defendant, the court finds they are self-serving 
and do not constitute liabilities against the partnership 
assets. 
9. The partnership agreement between the parties relating 
to the assets provided in paragraph 7 above terminated upon 
the trial of this case, and any contributions made by either 
of the parties to that time should be deemed part of their 
common effort and matched by the efforts and services of the 
other party for which no further accounting should be required. 
10. Any funds put into the partnership by the defendant 
were capital contributions matched by the efforts of plaintiff. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OK LAW 
1. There was no common law marriage between the parties, 
and the parties are not husband and wife. 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time phall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required. 
3. All the properties are ordered to be liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proceeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties. 
4. Plaintiff's first cause of action and all other causes 
based upon the existence of a common law marriage should be 
dismissed. 
5c No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
K • - . - , . 
DISTRICT JUDGE "!: 
DATED this /f 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
J U D G M E N T 
VS. : 
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064 
JOEL E. COLLEY, i 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appearing 
in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and witnesses 
including the parties having been sworn and testified, and 
exhibits having been received and the matter having been argued 
and submitted, and the court having received post-trial briefs 
and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there having 
been further argument on the interpretation and content of 
the Memorandum Decision, and the court now being fully advised 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action and all other causes 
of action based upon the existence of a common law marriage 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action. 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time shall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required. 
3. All the properties are ordered to be ^ liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proeeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties. 
4. No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
DATED this /f day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorney at Law 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L H J> 
n ffcwBB U^^Tr *mzzy 
OCT 1 •11988 
CJork, Smromo Court, |j:,ih 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Trial Court No. D82-3064 
Court of Appeals No. 
880123-CA 
Supreme Court No. 
EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Pursuant to Rule 45(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
defendant moves for an extension of time to file his Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari until 5:00 p.m. on October 14, 1988. 
Defendant represents as follows: 
1. Defendant's Petition for a rehearing in this matter 
was denied August 17, 1988. 
2. Defendant is still within the time for petitioning 
for a Writ of Certiorari. 
3. No previous extensions of time have been granted to 
defendant under Rule 45(e). 
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4. Defendant resides out of state and defendant's 
counsel did not receive authorization to proceed in this matter 
until September 7, 1988. 
5. Because of the press of other matters it is not 
possible for defendant's counsel to adequately prepare 
defendant's Petition within the remaining time required by Rule 
45(a). 
DATED this fZ* *~ day of September, 1988. 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
22.14 
4TE OF MONT AMU* 
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Filed for record this.... Jay of.. ... 19 at..... o'clock M, afl 
Recorded in Book of Deeds on Page of the Records of County of 
State of Montana Clerk and Recorder. By 
NO. 77 — ESCROW RECEHT. . , . , , , „ . u . - . . c. ..<<«.. . . . . 
ESCROW RECEIPT 
The undersigned Escrow Agent acknowledges receipt from 
KENNON E. MAAS and EDI!A RAE KAAS, husband and wi fe , here inaf ter referred to as 
SELLERS, anJ JOEL E. COLLET and ROBIN H. COLLET, Husand <fc Wife, as BUYERS. 
of the following described check** money, documents or property, to-wit: 
Contract for Deed 
notice of Purchaser's In teres t 
Warranty Deed 
Realty Transfer C e r t i f i c a t e 
which it agrees to hold as Escrow Agent under the following instructions, to-wit: 
To deliver to seller the documents as required under the terms of the contract. 
This escrow is taken expressly subject to terms, exceptions, provisions and conditions herein stated which are 
acceptable and approved by all of the parties accepting this receipt or interested in the escrow being as follows: 
f. The Escrow Agent shall be liable as a depository only and shall not be responsible for the sufficiency or 
accuracy of the form, execution or validity of documents deposited hereunder, or any description of property or other 
thing therein, nor shall it be liable in any respect on account of the identity, authority or rights of the persons executing 
or delivering, or purporting to execute or deliver any such document or paper. 
2. The Escrow Agent shall not be liable for collection items until the proceeds of the same in actual cash have 
been received; nor shall it be liable for the default in payment of any mstallmenl of principal or interest, nor the 
outlawing of any rights under the Statute of Limitations in respect to any documents deposited; nor for interest on any 
deposit of money. It may rely upon any paper, document or oilier Writing believed by it to be authentic in making any 
delivery of money or property hereunder. 
3. The Escrow Agent shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for its services; may employ attorneys for 
the reasonable protection of the escrow properly and of itself, and shall have the right to reimburse itself ou( of any 
funds in its possession for costs, expenses, attorney fees and its compensation and shall have a lien on all money, 
documents or property held in escrow to cover same. 
4. In aceept'utg any funds, securities or documents delivered hereunder, it is agreed and understood thai, in the 
event of disagreement bet' -cen the persons herein mentioned or persons claiming under them, or any of them, the Escrow 
Agent, will and does, reserve the right to hold all money, securities and property in its possession, and all papers in 
connection with or concerning this escrow, until a mutual agreement has been reached between all of said parties or 
until delivery is legally authorized by final judgment or decree of court. The Escrow Agent reserves the right to 
dispose of the escrow by interpleader or oilier suitable action in the event of controversy. 
5. Time is and shall be insofar as the Escrow Agent is concerned of the essence of this agreement and part of 
the consideration, and a waiver in one instance as to a time condition shall not operate to prevent an objection for any 
subsequent default in point of time. 
Executed at... I!IBSL..UhT10i:AL.JLMJ?l..of.. ELains,...Mt... 
(NAMB OP ESCROW AOENT) 
Date ^C....:.r£'.:. r^f . &u.£j-><* 
Approved: Title 
....^ r:.W U/.VN-... .S.1 ,.,'.':.:..../t.r^- ) Names of 
\....2T7\C >.' ?«f'. -.7- ..t i ?. - / Depositors 
A A A.ii!...^ (j'lLC\r\ ) *»d Crantee. 
If*. 
• t fm- H a 1 
T B B D U B , Maaaoate 1 s t day af October . » 7 5 . 
baasaaa Trl-Faa? Rea l ty Goeateny, « Colorado Corporat ion 
r.lawaa.attaafwatpaat.aaai J o e l * . Col iary and 
B o b i a Bough C o l l e y 
& /S taJI 
aftaa C i t y 
Catenate, at the aaa 
Ciaag af Denver aad State at 
*TLCf6 ftTAKP 
STATE OF COLORADO 
CJTT I COUNTY 
OF DENVER 
'HEDIW M'HFFICEOH 
DCTZJ I J S P H ' T S 
FJ.SEfUFINI 
- • p * \NOP,rcOR0ER 
• « t . 0 j 
WITNESSETH, teat taa aaa* party ef tha fbat part, far aad m tarn l e t thai 
•Domua T h i r t y - f i v e Thousand end llo/lOOtha -
aaal other read aad valaaaac aaaaftdarasaaa U the aaal party of tha firat past a haad paid by tha aaid paraaa «f taa 
aaaaad part* taa saaacpt waaaaaf ia haraby wanfanaarf aad ackaawiadfede baa grant**, baraanaat aaid aaal < 
aaal by thaaa paiauua aaac gnat, barsaiaw M O , n i l i f aaat confirm unto tha aaid paroaa af aasaaal pa 
faraaar, aat ia taaaary •* r nani nan bat a job* taaanasy,, *S taa taOovaai aaatrfbad km. 
af laaal aa)aaN% lyiaai aaal baaax at taa C i c y aad Coeaiy at -earaal at 
U r . l . n a i . t a i 
Denver 
Lot 36 ead the South 18 f e e t o f Let 3 7 , 
EXCEPT t h e rear or E a s t e r l y 6 f e e t t h e r e o f . 
Block 3 3 1 , 
CAPITOL AVENUE SDB8mSZ0H s THITO FXLIHC, 
Che p l a t of which was recorded l a PLst Book 6 
« t ?a«e 1 5 . 
A l so known and numbered aa 753 S t e e l e S t r e e t 
TOGETHER with afi aad nnrntar tba haraditaaaata aad a|»ym lamaaeaa theraaate halaticfafe ar a aayvaw 
P A - ! 
all tba aetata, right, title* iataraat, daca aad demand vfaaaaamar at tba aaid party ef tba first part, ntther a law or 
ocmity, of« a aad ta tba ahoYa barfaiaad p taat vita tba haradxaacaa aad aaperfeaaaaeaa, 
TO HATE AKD TO BOLD tba aaid preauaaa abova barffm&aad aad deasribad, with tba apfaffUatiaaaB, aaaa tba 
said parUaa ef tba aaeeod part, their haus aad aaataaa f o m « Aad tha aaid party at tba first pan, tar baaaatC baj 
hBfl£ exacsean, aad adaii&ta&sterfic dees oava&aat, craat, basram aad srrw ta aad with tba aaid partiae ai tba 
aaooad par^ thou- bare aad ftwagaa, that ai the tiaae at tba mauling aad dairvery «f tbcas pi I i , ba is veil adaad 
ef tba preauaea abeva oaavayad, aa at rood, aara, paxtaet, abaaiota aad indirff^l^a aetata at labanbiaaa* a anr, la 
faa aimpla, aad baa rood rirht, fall pewar aad lawful autbortty ta rraat, barraia, aaQ aad onrcy taa aasM a • • • 
asd fores atoreaaid, aad thai tba cam mxm £raa aad ekar tram all foraaar aad atbar rnata, barrahav, aaiaa, Qaaa, 
tasaa. i i m m f i i t t aad eaaumbr+aem mt waatavaF Idad or aatara aocvar, e x c e p t *"H t a x e s and a a a e a a -
seats for the year 197S aad subsequent jears; and subject to restrictLoos of 
record. 
at aad paaeaabla piiiMiriaa a t /^a aaid partfaa mt tba aaaaad p 
i aad aaaicBa of aaeb aonrtra*( acaiaat all aad ovary pemae or 
ert, tba aad tba abova barfaiaad praanlaaa ia tba oei t i 
amrrivw «f them, taanr aan«m aad tba baua 
Uwfolly daaaina «r ta daaa tba waoU ar aay part taareof, tba aatd part^'ot tba firat part aaafl aad«-iar V^SEAKT 
AND POREVEE DETENU Tba aacalar 
gaadar aoaJl ba applkaaU U all raadara, 
m WITNESS WHEREOF tba aaat party ti tba flrat part 
iEWVKk t baiOML caused i t s c o r p o r a t e aasae to 
and i t s corpora te s e a l t o be hereunto 
B plural tba aiacalar,. aaat taa- aaa at aay 
iifixedv attested by its Secretary the 
dav and ttar flreg abo^ i> w<tf>f.. 
2; 
h*Ai*x*ttu:*/ subsor ibed: o ^ IX t i 
Al ikbl ' : 
pt jZomomny* k Cdtoradpr>AT.| 
Corporat ion 
(BXAL) 
J President / " V 
•TATE OP 00L0SADO 
^ r O^ : =Bik? .vr^Oaaa«ra f Daari-
T b a t ^ i o i a f naatatfas* wae nHrawHwtgad aa/aaa aaa taaa 1 s t •«* ' •** O c t o b e r • * * 75 
f^e Kem g » / P e ¥ r > ^ * Presidcat aad Stcwea H« Cohea aa Secretary^Treaeurcr of 
: Tr i -Pkr M a l t y Coapaay, a Colorado, Corporat ion , , . ^ m . , , 
aaeaaraa : 1 / 1 7 / 7 a . ** "^Bthmm Wf baaal aad atfidal aaal 
/ I f f /yi -nrt.vi ^VHTIAJ 
I h n u , «« 
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STATC Of COlOtUOaV 
FMA poem MO. jam a 
THIS rNDEKTTJUE, 
DEED OF TRUST 
mam this 1st, 
•ad bitVJbJrn-rTTI 
Sosbaod and elf* 
the City «ad 
famed te as (he grants*, aad the Pabiic Ties* 
<*»**? «* Dear** 
day el October hi the year of em? Load oee 
, harems JOEL 2 . C0LL2T AJO BOBU HOUGH COLLET, 
, warns* •ddissa is 753 S t e e l e S t r e e t 
Cooety el Dearer , State el Colorado, hsismsrfaat m> 
• «i t b e C i t y sad 
Stale ol Coiwada, harexaalter leferred to as (he 
THAT, WHFIEAS, the pans or has executed bis certain proeiiseory i 
HELIA5CZ 7UHDX5G CGHPOHAnm 
2kk Onlrvrsitr Bird. 
i date herewith, payable ' 
, hereinafter referred to as the beneficiary, at DenTeX, Colorado 
for the principal seal el 'I'M f WW THHW THDUSAHD SIX HUNDRED AHD l O / l o o — 
(S 3 3 , 6 0 0 - 0 0 )• Wlt* u<«rest at the case ol l i n e 
( 0 %) per saaesi until paid, aed payable as follows, sanely* 
TWO HUHDHH) SmVtlTl AJED U6/100 DoUars <S 
coeimrnong oa the first day ol Icrember * 1° ? 5 , sad oa the first day ol each swath thereafter 
until the principal aad interest are fully paid, except that the final peymeat ol pnacipai sad interest, if act sooner 
paid, shall be dee end payable oa the fust day el October 2005 Said principal sea, to-
gether with interest thereon, aad other payments provided te be s>ade seder the terns ol this tn den rum?, are beats** 
aiter referred to es the i 
-OoUars 
la monthly installments ol 
270.«6 \ 
AND WHEREAS, the creator is desuoas sot oaiy ol securing the 
ol effectually secunaf aad u>demnirying to* beneficiary for aad/or 
guarantee ol the J ^—' " 
payment ol tbe indebtedness, bet also 
ount ol say assignment, eadoraeswmt, or 
NOV, THEREFORE, the creator, ia consideration ol the premises, sad for the purposes aforesaid, baa created, 
bargained, sold, sad conveyed, aad does hereby grant, bargain, sell, end cue.wry unto the trustee, m trust fon 
all those certata presuses sod property siCaate m the C i t y and 
Coasty ol Dearer • *ttd Slate ol Colorado, knows aad described as follows, to wit: 
Lot 36 and the South 18 feert of Lot 37 • 
ECC2PT the rear or Westerly 6 feet thereof. 
Block 331. 
CAPITOL AVOTJE SUHDIVTSI0H, THIRD f lUBC, 
the plat of vtdca vaa recorded in PLat Book 6, 
at Pa«e 15, 
City and Comity ot Denrex, 
State of Colorado 
0 0 3 J) 0 A •*! 
J m 
n^2 ' 
3 - i 
m» 
TCTLAVHE AND TO HOLD the same, together with all and singular the privileges and spperteneace* thereunto 
balancing: La Trust .Nevertheless, That is case ol default m the payment ol the indebtedness, or say part thereof, 
as the same shall become due, or in the peymeat ol eay prior encumbrance, principal or interest, if say, or la case 
default shall be made in. or in case ol notation or breach ol say ol the terms, conditions, covenants or agreements 
herein contained, the* opoa notice end demand m writing filed with the trustee as provided by law, it shall aad 
may be lawful for the trustee to foreclose this deed ol trust, sod to sell sad dispose ol said premises ea manae or 
m separate parcels (as the trustee may dunk beat) aad all the right; title, sad interest ol the grantor, therein, at 
public auction at the front doer ol the Courthouse, a the C i t y and » Cooaty ot 
Q , „ State ol Colorado, or oa said presuses, or any part thereof, ea may 
be specified m the notice ol such sale, far the highest and best price the saaw will bong in cash, four weeks1 pue-
lse notice having been paevioualy gtvem ol the tiase aad place ol such sale, by advertisement, weekly, la some 
newspaper ol general orcuiatioa the* published us the county aforesaid or by such other notice as may the* be re-
quired by Law end to issue, execute sod deliver his certificate ol purchase. Trustee's Deed and/or certificate of 
radearptioa all as thea mey be provided by Lew; aed the trustee shall, oat oi the proceeds or avails ol seen sale, 
sites first paying sad retaining all fees, charges, the coats of making said sale and advertising said preauaes, 
aad attorney's fees as berets provided, pay to the beneficiary hereunder, or the legal holder ol the indebtedness, 
the amount ol sach indebtedness, aad ail money* advanced by the beneficiary or legal bolder ol the indebtedness 
for insurance, repairs, and taxes and esmassmonta, wiut interest thereon mt the rate set forth m the note seemed 
hereby, rendering the overplus, if any, eato the grantor; which sale or sales sad said deed or deeds so mode shall 
be s perpetual bar, both is lew sad equity, against the grantor snd all other pt*anm claiming the premises sXora* 
said, or say part thereof by. from, through or under the grantor. The legal holder of the indebtedness may pun lues 
said property or any part thereof; aad .t *hmll net be obligatory noon the purchaser or purchasers at amy sach sale 
to so* te the epplicstioa ol the pair h e n moaey. If a release deed m required, the rrsotor hereby agrees to pay 
sll the expenses tbaeami. 
Aad the grantor covemaats sad agrees re and with 1 
of these presents be is well seised of 
authority to crest, bnxsaia, sell m 
CD 
CD 
O l 
thmt * the time ol the ensealing of snd delivery 
m fee simple, and baa flood right, full poeei and lawful 
si form aloresead; hereby fully aad absolutely 
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wmivtef and relsnaiag all rights and c la ims ae away have la or to sa*d lacaaaas a s a aoaanstoaai e'Xampdos, aanu 
and by virtue of any act oi the General Aaaembiy of the SUte of Colorado now exastnag <» wwoch may hereoitav a* 
Banned is relation thereto; aad that the u a r are b e e aad clear a! ail b e e s and aaaiaaa,— whatever, and the 
• bsui bargained praminaa ax the eatet aad pewceoale possess ion of the trustee, aeaios* ail aad every person or 
p i i i i w lawfully rtsunaxg a* as c i w a the wfcoae er amy part t h u d , the grmotor she i ! aad anil Warrant aad F u n a a 
Defend. 
Aad the grants*, hi esaJss moan {ally *» pawnor* dat security al this Dead of Treat, d o e s barney rrmimaat aad 
agree aa foils a a: 
L That be will nraanntty pay Che aruKtaml oi aad uvterest a s the iaoebtedmeea • • idaarad by the sand sa te , at 
the time* aad ts the smnxasr thereto provided. Privi lege ts reaerrad to pay the de«t HI aaaat, or aa aa in eono! 
to oae or oore monthly payments aa bat principal that M next doe aa the ooss . oa Cbc firs* day of aoy swath poor 
to maturity; provided,, aemwvex, that written notice of aa lateattnai to exerc i se ones svrvUees* ** gvwo at h a s t thirty 
(30) days poor to uisniJinisnt* 
Z That, teeethar well aad m addition to the monthly payments of pnocrpal aad tstevex* payable undo* (be 
tonus of tbe note teemed hereby„ be wtll pay to the beneficiary, ox the Gist day of each moeth until the said aota 
Is hilly paid, the faUcvia* somes 
(mj As nmouafi ssfficient to provide the bolder hereof with folds to pay tbe nest mortgage iasarance imanaai If 
this instrument and tbe sore secured hereby are insured, or a monthly charge ( i s ixea oi a mortgage ins as 
a sce premium) if they are beid by the Secretary of Housing aod Urban Developawit a s falJovw* 
(D If aaa* a* law* aa w M aata mi •<rmm mmtm aaa) t a i s b i t n w t t mrm kamawi me mrm n a w p a l aa.aar « M pravia laaa «f* 
tfce Rat laae l Havana; * « « • » • • • • • * mmtncimmi to • c c a a w l a t * la l a * aaaaa ot mm hmlAm mmm (1) awadi prtmr t * S a 
a a e 4 e t c Ua« aaaiMaA a a r t « a « « m a n r a a c • a w a i a a , la oroar ta provimm a a c a e « i a a r «t»at aaaoa U a a f c a c S p n a l a a 
l a tap Secretary *5 Ho«Mat« aaa Uraaai D * * i l o a a n ( aaraaaat ta a>* WaUaaal Hi iaalag Act« aa aawn4ed c a a c aa» 
p4i«aaie Ba«aAatiaa« t h i m a a i a i ; ar 
(II) » aaa aa i a a c *m —h4 aota a< « r a a a i a } aval to la iaatruawat arc a a t a by taa Sac»atary «f ff<waioc « a 4 Urbaa d a -
valaaaarat. • aiaalhly e a e r r * ( la limn mi a mmrt^mmm ataaraacv prmmtinm} amich s a a l l mm km mm i 
t w a i n * ( 1 / 1 2 ) «* aaa Hatf (ft) a«v caataas W taa avarac* a a t s t a n 4 i a « mmlmmem mmm a a Oto 
ta a c c a a a s a a l i a a a a n m a a aar avayjayaaaaam. 
(h) A sas$ eejuai to the ground rents, d any,, serf dae, pios tbe premium* that will next becos)e doe aad payable 
oa pol ic ies oi fire aad other hazard utterance oa the premises covered hereby,, pfcxs tajurs aad a s s e s s stents 
aezt due os these premises (ail as esttawted by the beneficiary) l e s s aU suaas already paid therefor divided 
by tbe ausiber of souths to e lapse before ooe month prior to the date vhea sach croi»d rents, presutuss,, 
t s s e s , and assessments will becoaai delinquent, such sums to be beid by tbe beswficuB'y ta trast to pay 
said ground rents, premiums, t e s e s , and special assessments , and —, 
fc> All payments mentioned in the t v o preceding subsections of this paraf raph and alt p a y m e n t s to be mode 
snder the note secured hereby shall be added together *nd the aggregate amount thereof shall be pm*d by 
tbe grantor eacfe month is a s ingle payment to be applied by the beneficiary to t h e l o l l o w i n g items i s tbe 
order se t fottte 
CD pramtam ettmrmmm ajaear taa e o a o a c t ofaMuyrcace viUs UaaSavratary mi HeaaaM! ami tfia— I>a-a^tapmaaC me anuflaiy 
eaarra ( la i i aa oi akartceae uiauraaca pnemmmm}0 e e tba c a a a mmy mm% 
(TX) t a s e a . r s a c t a i aaaaaaaMWlc ftra> a a a otaav toasajal laawraaca lUtmummmMi 
(TIT) aM«?aa< aa taa a a t e aacara«l havaOyi aa*1 
(TV) najaiuaaUaa W taa anacaaeJ mi mmmt aaaab 
Any deficiency is the amount of such aggregate monthly payment snai l , unless made good by the grantor 
prior to the dne date of the n*xi such payment, constitute so event of defoaft aader this Deed of Trast. 
Tbe grantee may col lect a " la te charge" sot to exceed two cent s (2c) for each dollar (SI) of each pay-
sarnt more than fifteen ( IS)days in arrears to cover the extra expense iniroived i s handlingdeiinquest payments. 
i Tbaf if the total of tbe payments made by the grantor under ^ p a r a g r a p h 2 preceding shall exceed the amoant 
of payments actually made by the beneficiary for taxes or as ses sments or insurance premiums, a s the c a s e may be, 
such e x c e s s , ml the option of the beneGciary shaii be credited by the beneficiary on subsequent payments to be made 
by the grantor, or refunded to the grantor. U, however, the monthly payments made by the grantor under fkj of pmtm -
graph 2 preceding shall not be sufficient to pay taxes and assessments and lesurance premtoms a s th9 c a s e may be, 
wnen the same shall become due and payable, then the grantor snail pay to the beneficiary any amount necessary to 
make up Ine deficiency, on or before the dale when payment of such taxes , a s se s sments , or insurance premiums snail 
be duec if at any U a e the grantor shall tender to the beneficiary, in accordance with the provisions of the note se» 
cured hereby,, full payment of the entire indebtedness represented thereby,, the beneficiary shal l , *n computing the 
•mount of such indebtedness, credit to the account of the grantor ail payments made under the provisions of (m) of 
psragraph 2 hereof, which the holder of said note has not become obligated to pay to the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, and any balance remaining m the funds accumulated under the provisroas of (bf of paragraph 2 
hereo4 if there shall be a default under any of the provisions of this Deed of Trust resulting ta s public sa le by the 
trustee or trustees of the premises covered hereby, or tf the beneficiary acquires the property otherwt s e after default, 
the beneficiary shall apply, at the time of the commencement of such proceedings, or at the tiaie the property i s otbe*. 
wise acquired, ihe balance then remaining la the funds accumulated under (htol paragraph 2 preceding, a s s credit 
sgsiast die amount of principal then remaining unpaid under said note, sad shall properly adjust any payments which 
shall have been made snder (m) of oarmgraph 2c 
4 That he will pay all taxes , a s s e s s m e n t s , water rates, mnd other goverrunantal or annuel pal charges, f ines , 
or impositions, for which provision has not been made hereinbefore, snd w default thereof the beneficiary may pay 
the same, aad that be will promptly deliver the official sscetpts therefor to the heamfiaare* 
S. Tha* he wtll keep the UBSWvewarnts now ex is t ing or hereafter erected on the said paessuies, insured s s may 
be reaaired from time to time by thm beneficiary against l o s s by fire mad other haxards, ca sua l t i e s , sad contin-
gencies is such aoKMists *nd for such periods a s may be required by the beneficiary snd wil l pay promptly, whan 
doe. any presuuxas on such wsuronor provisions for payment of which has aot been mode hereinbefore. Ail w a r -
s a c s shall be carried m companies approved by the beneficiary and the pol ic ies and rearaniis thereof shall be held 
by the beneficiary and have attached thereto ioos payable c lauses us favor of sttd tm form acceptable to the beam* 
ficiary. Is event of loss the grantor will give immediate notice by mail to the beneficiaryp who may mass proof o i 
loss tf sot mode promptly by the grantor, and each insa^aace company concerned i s hereby aathorured and dinrctod 
to make payment for such l o s s directly to toe beneficiary instead of to the grantor and the bameficiary jointly, s sd 
the tassreacw proceeds, or any port thereof, may be sopited by the beuefteiasy at i ts options either to the redocttas 
of the indebtedness hereby sacaied or to the restoration or repair of the property dsmaged. Is event of foreclosure 
of this Dead of Treat or other transfer of title ta the said premises m extisgiBishaieat of iths> ssoebtedoeaa aacnrad 
hereby, all right, title, and latareat of the grnaiar as sad ta any insurance pol ic ies thorn m farce shall p a s s te too 
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a s the? •*• now oad will an* conmmt m 
oi< 7» That If the prssmees. « - ? ptft thetemi, be casdemowd sadec an? -
a public use , ths dnmaaes, proceeds, and law caaaideraaoa for s u e s acquisition^ to the csntmt o i the fall 
of utdebtedaesa aaae than Deed oi Ttwat, and the aoot secured hereby remaiaiae, aaoard. aa* hereby 
be the grants* to the seeef loary aad sae i l he pasd forthwith the bsue&ciary *» he spoi led by it on 
oi the l n U M H m m i aocared heresy, wmetses a e « M L 
L, The grantor farther agrees the* thee Id this Dead ui Trust aad the note secured hereby oot be e l ig ib le for 
mnuv/unce eader the NaUeaal Housta*; Act witaaa from the date hereof (written statement ad 
aey officer oi the Deo«rtsMaa< ei Houaiae, aad Urbae Development or authorised aceat oi the Secretary oi Houaiae 
and Urbae Development dated subsequent te the tiam froai the date oi this Deed oi Trust, 
dec lmiac to insura said act* tad this Deed oi Treat, b e i * t deemed conclus ive prooi oi such ineligibil i ty) , tfcar 
bemeiiciary or the holder oi the note a e y . at i ts opaoa . declare ait soaja secured hereby immediately dao aad peyesea. 
%. That 1a the event o i default ta the payment o i t h e indebtedness of any part thereof, or oi a breach or violation 
oi any oi tue covenants or agreements herein, them, aad in that event , the whole oi the indebtedness and the in-
terest thereon to the time oi sa ie . any at once, at the option oi the beneGciary or the legal holder oi the tndebted-
• e s s . be declared due and payable, and the said premises to be sold u> the meaner and with the same effect aa d 
(he iodebtedness had matured, aad thmt if foreclosaje? i s made by the trustee, the panto* agrees te pay the susf o i 
Dollars (S ) . as attor-
ney's fees for services in connection with said foreclosure proceedings, and said attorney's fee shall be allowed 
and added by the trustee to the cost oi foreclosure; and if foreclosure be made through the courts, a reasonable 
attorney's fee shmil be taxed by the court as a part o i the- cost of such foreclosure proceedings, and any and all 
such attorney's feea shall be aad become a part o i the indebtedness secured heresy. 
10. That in c a s e oi default, whereby the ncht o i foreclosure occurs hereunder, the beneficiary or the holder oi 
the indebtedness or certificate oi sa le shall at oace become entit led to the posses s ion . use and enjoyment oi the 
property aforesaid, and to the rents, i s sues and profits thereof, from the accruinc of such right and during the pead-
eacy oi foreclosure proceedings and the penod oi redemption. if any there be; and such possess ion , ase . enjoyment. 
rents, i s s u e s and profits shall at once be delivered to the beaeftciory or the holder oi the indebtedness of certx5-
ca te oi sa le oa request, and on refusal, the delivery o i such p o s s e s s i o n may be enforced by the beneficiary or the 
holder ai the indebtedness or certificate oi purchaae shall be entitled to a Receiver for said property, and of the 
rents, i s s u e s snd profits thereof, after any such default, inc ludmt d>« t»«- covered by foreclosure proceedints and 
the period oi redemption, tf any there be, and skmll be entitled thereto a s a Barter of ncht without retard to the 
so lvency or insolvency of the grantor or oi the then owner oi said property and without retard to the value o i the 
property, and such Receiver any be appointed by aay court of competent jurisdiction upon ex parte application, and 
without notice, notice beint hereby expressly waived, and the appointment of any such Receiver, on any such an* 
plication without notice, beint Hereby consented to by the grantor for and on his own behalf oi his heirs, a s s i c a s 
and l e t s l representstives, and all persons ciainun*, by. through or under htm, and all rents, i s sues and profits, 
income and revenue oi said property shall be applied by such-Receiver accordmt to law and the orders and direc-
tions oi the < 
Notice oi the exercise oi any option granted herein, or in the note secured hereby, to the beneficiary u aot 
required to be ttven, the crsntor hereby watvmt nay such n o d e s . 
The covenants herein contained shall bind, aad the benefits and advantages shall inure to, the respective 
heirs , executors, administrators, successors and a s s i g n s of the parties hereto. Then ever used, the singular num-
ber shall include the plural, the plural the singular, aad the u s e of^any tender shall be applicable to all gende 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the grantor has hereunto se t his Mand/and sgs l on the, day and^year first hereinbe-
fore wnttea. 
Signed, sealed aad delivered ta the presence of r . CSEAL] 
R 0 B I 3 HOUGH COi 
S E A L ] 
[SEAL] 
CSEAL] 
STATE OF COLORADO | ' i * iO*IOo~ •*' * 
("•' /Vf\.' .fo\. 
COUNTY OF Arapnvbow J / fl 1*1 ~ V i \ 
The forego lag instrument was acknowledged before me this 1 s t day oi Octobca* V* **'*J^ \ C * 
19 75- W Joe l 2 . Colley *»* Robin Houg^fioHer»" Husband s a d j ^ w ^ | £ - | \ l j ^ z\z.', ' ^ *: 
WITNESS my hand and official aeei . 
My commission expires 
C S E A L V ^ 
STATE OF COLORADO 
COUNTY OF J 
I hereby certify (hat this instrument was filed Car record ia my off ice at 
19 , and i s duly tecorded is boos 
o'clock « . . 
CUrk mmd *«cw»W«r 
Dmfmtj 
ana •m>om 
1141 449 
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RELIANCE 
FUNDING 
1ZDE& SHEET ATTACHED TO AMD MADS PAJtX <* DK2D 
TOCETHE& also with any and all award end awards heretofore ma^ le and 
hereafter to be made by any Municipal or State authorities to the present 
aad all subsequent owners of the premises herein descrUxsd* Including any 
award or awards for any charge or charges of grade of streets, effecting 
said previses which said award and awards are hereby assigned to the said 
mortgsgme, and the legal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
mortgagee; and the said mortgagee,, for the said mortgagee, and the legal 
reoresestatlves, successors and aaslgns of the mortgagee (at its or their 
option) Is hereby authorized* directed and empowered to collect and re-
ceive the proceed of any such award and awards frost the authorities msrlttg 
the aasK and to give paper receipts and acquittances therefor, and to 
apply the same toward the payment of the amount owing; on this deed aad its 
aecompasylng bond* notwithstanding the fact that the amount owing on ac-
count of this deed and said bond may sot be then due and payable; and the 
said mortgagor for the said mortgagor
 9 and the legal representatives, suc-
cessors and aaslgns of the mortgagor, hereby covenants aad agrees to end 
with the UM±d mortgagee and the legal representatives, successors sad 
saslgns of the mortgagee, upon request by the holder of this d^td to make, 
execute and deliver any and all assignments and other instruments suffi-
cient for the purpose of assigning the aforesaid award and awards to the 
holder of this deed, free, dear and discharged of any aad all encusbranees 
of any kind or nature whatsoever. 
The right of the mortgagee to collect monthly installments of water 
rates shall be deemed, wherever applicable, la such localities as may have 
them* to Include sewer rents and like charges. 
This is a purchase money first mortgage gives as part payment of the 
purchase price for the conveyance of these premises to the mortgagor here* 
la, and this mortgage is intended to be recorded simultaneously with the 
TOGETHER with all the right, title aad interest of the mortgagors of, 
la aad to any land lying in the bed of the street in front of and adjoining 
the above premises to the center Hues thereof. 
DENVER. COLORADO A020S . 244 UNIVERSITY BLVTA 
EAST MEADOW. N. Y. 11S&4 • 2160 HEMPSTEAD TPKE 
BROOKLYN. N. Y. 11219 • I860 FLATBDSH AVE. 
WSWBURGK. X.T. 1256* • 230 BROADWAY STREET 
GRAND JCT. COXA 8 ISO I • 4*4 MAIN ST. (sum *300) 
POUGHXEEPSIE, N.Y. 1200& • SO WASHINGTON STREET • (»14> 
1FC MS - IM - 4/7* 
P. O. 
( t i e ) 
( 2 1 2 ) 
( » l « ) 
( 2 0 2 ) 
B O X 2 2 2 7 
S3»«O0O0 
2 S 2 - 2 0 S 2 
i i i - a t t i 
2 4 K - 1 2 2 0 
. (SOS) 2 2 0 - 4 1 0 4 
. ( 2 1 2 ) 2 « 2 - 2 t 0 l 
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CASH RESERVE MGT INC 
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HEM MEXICO' 
• 1.0 0 0: 
19.750. 
VALUE ** 
2236500 
197500 
» PORTFOLIO TOTAL iVALUE xx vxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ;xxxxxxxx; 2'»34C00 ! i I 
_
 wi „L _ _[ !«-. • 1 ' ' ' " -.-- J~ - -
AS} REQUIRED BY LAW, THE I Y E A R - T O - D U E DIVIDENDS AND/OR REGISTERED BOND INTEREST 
S H C W ATI THE TOP. OF THIS.' STATEMENT WILL HE REPORIED TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE i 
SERVICE.) COUPON BOND INTEREST AND MARGIN INTEREST, IF ANY, AS SHClsN ABOVE ARE 
FOR YCUR: isrORr.ATICMI. DIViDLNDS FROM CASH RESERVE MANAGEMENT ASE NOT ELIGIBLE 
,FCR EXCLUSION OP, DEDUCTION FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES, 
j 
I f—. » • i n pi 
E F. Hulton & Company Inc. 
l>..#> K J " C T »'•••» »"«•»•• H r ~ To«» Hf »OlV« 
»'c«r 
( • • r . l 
0 .*«A 
VM . . 
.-•••v 
\ . • • 1 
••• \- , 
•'*» ' ' 
i« - v . 
» - . . 
-> •' 
• w " r . 
. • * % * • 
• » \ * •• 
l / » \ I W i f 
. . . ' U »r» 
1 . « . . » . . . . * * •, 
J ^ ' » ' »» 
•»l • U<' . • P t» 
..' , o . . t* . -« 
f-•?. 
I . • i QliiJ 
Gump and Flyers (p Zjc??. / _£_. Cc?//*^ , /r,j>. /$ 
i\iZf'~ ESTATES. I N C . 
JI'SO C O U T H 1 3 0 0 E A S T 
:r»AI_T L A K E C ITY , U T A H S- i lOe 
OOt -1O6-07O4 
EG. 
Address and Tvne 
520 9th Avenue, S.L.C. Triplex 
Purcluse Price Balarce Mark-fit Value >. 
fas. c-f*^ul 's-s 
$40,000.00 $31,900.00 $60,000.00 
1358 Roberta, S.L.C. House 39,900.00 33,000.00 44,000.00 
3fl2 Leslie Avenue House 43,000.00 40,000.00 45,000.00 
5J4 Hist Wilson House 39,000.00 36,000.00 44,000.00 
221 Kast Erc-.ning House 39,900.00 32,000.00 41,030.00 
15S3 South 400 IlisL Duolex 45,000.00 42,000.00 59,000.00 
F l a t h e a d Lard 40 Acre: 81 ,000 .00 57,700.00 100,000.00 
Hot f p r i n t s Land 10,000.00 2000.00 13,000.00 
7C0 Northcliffe Drive House 127,500.00 96,500.00 175,000.00 
77? South 700 East SOLD 32,000.00 C o n t r a c t ba l ance of $15,000.00 
371,100.00 - 551,000.00 
+ 15,000.00 c e n t r a : 
596,000.00 
K \ T v.\.;jr,--,;;224,900.00 
/vW- ' Weaker VfiLuei u?~* Ca^d^k ckhidd 
y y-1\ i\ i % I ^ J I N i I M U U . • . - . . . — T M c r /• c *•• c; N r i n m n ' N G •L i 
_ J 
A
 c , i r, <« •« i * 0 O O « 7 • «C»3» * 0 J 0 7 3 
To Indvt-r ( . O M i ' A M In l.«*r,.*<- *ur*»l% f^r tKr I n <1<-r-. * n "<*. <" »* . r r - p t 
M n U X . : T H I S KOflM V H . l . NO C UK A C X K f TKH KKOM A i M M . l C A M S M»«< l . O \ ^ ! HI X D O N JIONDS. 
^ 
?AA VV^J(;.\: 
' -LSS A. - iO'USS 
<Cnr : 
? PlAfrfflFf'5 
ArmEmH 
HO»-.C A D O * E S S : . -
I N H A N K 
ASSETS 
rrr; 
) CN HAS'O 
U s . QCNCS. ETC. 
r 
>UN7S R E C E I V A B L E 
t 
3 1 s ^ _ ^ -
C s 
O * I? KCCEIVABUE 
) r O ' < Y A S O M C f t C H A N C t S E ' E : > 
PMC N T ' <= ' 1.1'._. 
U A f W i m E i 
O U C T O H A N K S 
F E D E R A L I N C O M E T A X 
A L U O T W K R T A X E S 
A C C O U N T S P A Y A J I L E 
N O T C S P A Y A B L E L°Ji 
D U E C N r O U i r ^ C N T 
D U E O N P T A L E S T A T E 
O T HcTF? L I A G I L f T i C S 
i G i s 
JH|s_ 
C A P I T A L S T O C K (IF * CC^ TC^A TfONJ j : 
S U R P L U S NET WORTH 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
* 5 
M ( S T O r t A N N I N C t 
m-O I « P I M C 
..0<i.:J: l £ 
C M O S * i M C O W ^ f n O M B U S I K t l l A C T I V I T 1 C * . 
c»o«» m c o m r*ou ALL oT^rn ©ounces 
l O T A t INCOME a L -—-
. s 
. * 
u ^ C N ^ c i cr C O H O U C T I H S B U S I K - C S C 
S A L A A d t TO 0 / * I C £ K » C « * A * T N C * « 
O i V f C S N t O n r A l O O U ^ I N O YC A * . . . . . . . . . . . : . . o f _ -
r c o t n A u . T A : : I « A C T U A L L Y P A I D O U R I N C Y C A * i ^ . 
» C « C * V C rO* f l O t f l A L T * X £ » F O « C U n n t NT Y C * « . . . . f 
T C T A l cX?c?.'D!TU3ES • . 
N«.T PWO^»T O * L O M , 
i r N O i * f * O V I « l O N MAS BCCN M A D S FOR r C Q E » A U T A X C S *OH C U n * * £ N T Y X A * . 
I T A T f t CTItrf A T < D AWOUN*.* „ • . . •x-k.iL 
*e»% yrA-trt •+sir\t j r s . 
- i^-
• • < # -. • C O * 
J 
O » o « » » I C U * l O » 
~J:. 
• • * . k » • U i • • • ." » ' 
Q rr. 
o e v c o ^ p c;!n- J I U S T CHI C C M P L ^ T i D 
IF HOT SUFFICIENT SPACE. ATTACH fFFAaATE SCHTOULFS 
re. 
<-> 
LE 
T
~ 
.E 
Y L 
P.*U»t,A*OACC**f*3r « A H < 
( i , ) i : K ; I-. : .- I' -..••: :::H 
I ;;""n" - J 
J tV. ; . l ..•«•• V. !. 7 ' " ' .• •' --»••• 
N A M C O f J t C U « I T Y 
1 f * O v t W H O M D U X 
" ' » • • - . : • i . • . * ' • • • ; * 
r*OM W H O M cue 
1-1 
M 
N O 
0»4A*1 
j A C C O U N T 
j NO 
l 6 "<M;*> 7; f 
' 1 . ' •• ; • . • ' . 
1 3 
P A W 
V A L U X 
1 A H O U M T 
V: • ' ' . ' • 
A M O U N T 
1 j ' . • r ( ' 
'.-.' < •* 
| M * ft e C ? 
j V A U U 4 
| OATC 
I OUC 
D*.TK 
OUC j 
D E S C R I P T I O N 
I H V / ' .«0*K N « W | 
l--V\).'i\ iV-Kf j> 
" " . . • • • > 
» { 
J K W K C 5 I ! M A U C 
TO w w C M DUZ 
! • 
. . 
T O W N O W OUK 
' .' 
COS.? 
1 
O v r f O TO 
ft A M < 
| - ; > - • -
i 
AN 
"~ <. 
' l - l f TKit O. T 
O n * W M A f 
• 
- : 
A.;*GxJHf 
A M O U N T J 
1 
ratct M 4 T K 
DE5CKIKTION C O S T P H I C C e*\**C£lAT!OV 
C H A K J O C / P 
HOOK V t L U t : r N C U O F 4 M C f . 
A O O R f e a A N © D t » C » I P T ! O N IN WHO-nt, K'AHS IS TSTLC SALE V A U U C 
AMOUNT OP 
MOnTCAC( 
«* A 
MO* 
. i - . . , , v *. ; 
GE3CKIPTIO** OF O T H t * A 6 3 H I A M O U N T D t O C * » P T J O N OP O T V i t * L U O l b * T ; £ l 
./"• J 
!y i s hereby £?»r.te« t o a n y s n d i v i d u a l . f i rm or c o r p o r a t i o n , <*nd any f i.*.«^c i* I iriMHuSic.n t o f u / m s h F R H M f l M T T%\"ii**"« 
w^ors i t s i«?q«?*f w i t h »".> inf o.'ir.i! ion C i ^ C f n u r . - , ; t h e *i*o*e s : i i » r .e :^! of p ^ f t a i n i n ^ '• c» the t\*>.ic» s i,:". '*i 's f: 
rrcfiJ of T.an.*»*r of r f e ; j n ; e*bt» £ fct »or»5„ / . ; , 
-
 ?
 • • ^ . — / ' - _ > / • / 
_ _
 # • / • CACCO TMS3. ; \ . . U j f . J , k _ _ _ - X . U - . . „ i L L ^ U : „ o > v OP ... ,./!.< :r-/ . • • , ? • / -
Gumpsnd Flyers 
R E A L E S T A T E . I N C . 
2 1 2 0 S O U T H 1 3 0 0 E A S T 
S A U T L A K E C l T Y . U T A H C 4 l O O 
OOI 4 0 G - 6 7 0 4 
EB. 
Address and Type 
*>20 9th Avenue, S.L.C. Triplex 
*<^ie.* 
^ r h z ^ v i f / 7 ^ ^ **Mfe]fct Value 
$40,000.00 $31,900.00 $60,000.00 
.358 Roberta, S.L.C. House 39/900.00 33,000.00 44,000.00 
82 Leslie Avenue House 43,000.00 40,000.00 45.0C0.00 
14 East Wilson House .39,000.00 36,000.00 44,000.00 
33 East Browning House 59,900.00 32,000.00 41,000.00 
553 South 400 East Duplex 45,000.00 42,000.00 59,000.00 
Lathead Land 40 Acres 81,000.00 57,700.00 100,000.00 
>t Springs Land 10,000.00 2000.00 13,000I00 
10 Northc l i f fe Drive House 127,500.00 96,500.00 175,000.00 
'2 South 700 East SOLD 32,000.00 Contract balance of $15.000.CC 
371,100.00 531,000.00 
+ 15,000.00 contra 
596,000.00 
P VALUD=$224,900.C0 
' 0 ' ffa,y>>th, 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cameron S. Denning, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. I am employed as a legal secretary by John D. Parken. 
Mr, Parken has been assisting Bert L. Dart in the preparation of a Brief in 
Opposition to a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the case of Hough v. Colley. 
2. On Monday, November 14,1988,1 called the Office of the Clerk 
of the Utah Court of Appeals concerning the Hough v. Colley Case and spoke with 
the Deputy Clerk handling that file, Kathleen. 
3. I inquired of her on what date the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing had been denied and was informed that the Petition for Rehearing had 
been denied on July 29, 1988. 
4. Thereafter, I went to the Office of the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals and asked for a copy of the denial. Although I was shovm three sheets 
dated July 29, 1988, on which two of the Judges had voted "deny" and on which one 
of the Judges had voted for a "response," the Office of the Clerk would not give me 
copies of these three sheets. 
5. Each of the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
DATED this ft day of November, 1988. 
\ytc6esfH' JA* Cameron Sc Denning >-
SUBSCRffiED and SWORN TO before me this [fy^day of 
November, 1988. 
Commission Expires: < Notary Public 
Residing at 808 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
Utah 
A-33 
